Old Creek Rites

Eagleton, Terry. Critical Revolutionaries. Yale University Press, Connecticut: 2023 (page 5). 

Me: 

Accompanying Eagleton’s first question are companions: 1) Is moral sensitivity innate to humanity, or is it learned? And, 2) is the measure of moral sensitivity, action? 

Clearly, moral sensitivity exists independently of our verbal capacity. Universal archetypes of children with their undeveloped communication abilities represent innocence as a moral compass. However, the complexity this question hints at is not about undeveloped capabilities but rather about biases and hypocrisies. 

For example, there is a long-standing statistical bias that reminds us that correlation is not causation. Just because many wise “men” are educated does not mean that all “men” are wise, and likewise, just because education frequently leads to wisdom does not mean it always results in the same outcome. 

On a large scale, Eagleton’s question pokes at a widespread bias that having developed verbal ability (high levels of reading, writing, and comprehension skills) makes a person more morally capable, while those who are uneducated have fewer moral standards. This is what we would call an unconscious bias: when pointed out, it is clearly incorrect, but when hidden, it can infiltrate how people perceive individuals, situations, and even how policy is made. 

Similarly, the question identifies the hypocrisy of the association between a high level of verbal capability and moral sensitivity. The implication being that greater moral sensitivity would make a person LESS susceptible to moral corruption. Unfortunately, this is not clear, as we have repeatedly witnessed the failings of very verbally adept leaders across the globe throughout history and throughout every discipline (religious leaders, politicians, academics, lawyers, doctors, philosophers, humanitarians, etc., etc.). 

That said, I have asked whether moral sensitivity is innate to humanity or learned. Likewise, it has been questioned whether violence is innate or learned. The United Nations has responded with an articulate no. However, from an archetypal perspective, I would argue that there is a symbolic legacy of both peace and violence that shapes humanity’s ethos. 

However, while we develop verbal capacity to explore our reactions, identify biases and hypocrisies, and negotiate conflict and peace, the authenticity of moral sensitivity is revealed through action. If the words do not align with the action, then the morality is corrupt.  

ChatGPT:

The connection between verbal capability and moral sensitivity is real but limited. They are intertwined in important ways, yet neither reduces to the other, and their relationship is contingent rather than necessary.

1. Why verbal capability does matter for moral sensitivity

a. Moral concepts are linguistically structured

Much of human moral life depends on concepts such as intention, responsibility, harm, fairness, dignity, and rights. These concepts are refined, differentiated, and transmitted through language. Greater verbal ability allows a person to:

• Make finer moral distinctions (e.g., accidental vs. negligent harm)
• Articulate reasons and justifications
• Recognize conflicts between values (e.g., loyalty vs. honesty)

Philosophers like Wittgenstein and Murdoch emphasize that moral perception itself is partly shaped by the vocabulary available to us: learning new words can genuinely change what we are able to notice morally.

b. Moral reflection and deliberation are language-heavy

Explicit moral reasoning—asking what ought I to do and why?—typically relies on inner speech, narrative framing, and argument. Verbal skill supports:

• Perspective-taking (imagining how an action looks to others)
• Self-criticism and moral learning
• Participation in moral practices like apology, justification, and promise-making

In this sense, verbal ability expands the scope and depth of moral sensitivity.

2. Why moral sensitivity is not reducible to verbal capability

a. Pre-linguistic and non-verbal morality

Strong evidence suggests that moral sensitivity exists prior to and independent of sophisticated language:

• Infants show sensitivity to fairness, helping vs. harming, and distress in others.
• Non-human animals display empathy, reciprocity, and aversion to suffering.
• Aphasic individuals or those with limited verbal ability can retain moral concern and responsiveness.

These cases indicate that core moral emotions—empathy, guilt, indignation, compassion—are not language-dependent.

b. Moral perception often precedes articulation

We frequently feel that something is wrong before we can say why. Moral sensitivity often appears as:

• Immediate emotional response
• Somatic discomfort
• Intuitive recognition of harm or injustice

Language typically follows, refining or correcting these responses rather than creating them from scratch.

3. Asymmetries: verbal skill without moral sensitivity, and vice versa

a. High verbal ability, low moral sensitivity

History and psychology offer many examples of rhetorically gifted individuals who use language to rationalize cruelty, manipulate others, or obscure harm. Verbal sophistication can even mask moral insensitivity by providing elegant justifications.

This shows that verbal skill can serve moral disengagement as well as moral insight.

b. High moral sensitivity, low verbal ability

Conversely, individuals may be deeply attuned to suffering and fairness yet struggle to articulate their judgments. Their moral sensitivity is evident in action—care, restraint, protest—rather than argument.

4. A plausible synthesis

A helpful way to frame the relationship is this:

• Moral sensitivity has affective and perceptual roots that do not depend on language.
• Verbal capability scaffolds, extends, and stabilizes moral sensitivity, allowing it to become reflective, shareable, and revisable.

Language does not generate morality, but it transforms it—turning raw moral perception into ethical understanding, deliberation, and collective norms.

5. Bottom line

Verbal capability and moral sensitivity are partially but not essentially bound together. Language enhances moral sensitivity by sharpening distinctions, enabling reflection, and supporting social moral practices, but the foundations of morality lie deeper—in emotion, perception, and social attunement. A society’s moral depth depends not just on how well it can talk about morality, but on how well it can see and respond to one another.